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Abstract
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even
approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete. We present a surprisingly simple
polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate Nash equilibria in these games. In par-
ticular, for congestion games with linear latency functions, our algorithm computes (2+ ǫ)-approximate
pure Nash equilibria in time polynomial in the number of players, the number of resources and 1/ǫ. It
also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with constant maximum degree d; there, the
approximation guarantee is dO(d). The algorithm essentially identifies a polynomially long sequence of
best-response moves that lead to an approximate equilibrium; the existence of such short sequences
is interesting in itself. These are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in
non-symmetric congestion games. We strengthen them further by proving that, for congestion games
that deviate from our mild assumptions, computing ρ-approximate equilibria is PLS-complete for any
polynomial-time computable ρ.
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1 Introduction
Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory.
It characterizes situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no player has any incentive to
unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff. Questions related to their
existence and efficient computation have been extensively addressed in the context of congestion games.
In these games, pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist through potential function arguments: any
pure Nash equilibrium corresponds to a local minimum of a potential function. Unfortunately, this proof
of existence is inefficient and computing a local minimum for this function is a computationally-hard task.
This statement has been made formal in the work of Fabrikant et al. [14] where it is proved that the problem
of computing a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete.
Such negative complexity results significantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solu-
tion concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players. Approximate pure Nash equilibria, which
characterize situations where no player can significantly improve her payoff by unilaterally deviating from
her current strategy, could serve as alternative solution concepts1 provided that they can be computed ef-
ficiently. In this paper, we study the complexity of computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in
congestion games and prove the first positive algorithmic results for important (and quite general) classes of
congestion games. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate pure
Nash equilibria in congestion games under mild restrictions.
Problem statement and related work. Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal [20]. In a conges-
tion game, players compete over a set of resources. Each resource incurs a latency to all players that use it;
this latency depends on the number of players that use the resource according to a resource-specific, non-
negative, and non-decreasing latency function. Among a given set of strategies (over sets of resources), each
player aims to select one selfishly, trying to minimize her individual total cost, i.e., the sum of the latencies
on the resources in her strategy. Typical examples include network congestion games where the network
links correspond to the resources and each player has alternative paths that connect two nodes as strategies.
Congestions games in which players have the same set of available strategies are called symmetric.
Rosenthal [20] proved that congestion games admit a potential function with the following remarkable
property: the difference in the potential value between two states (i.e., two snapshots of strategies) that
differ in the strategy of a single player equals to the difference of the cost experienced by this player in
these two states. This immediately implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Any sequence of
improvement moves by the players strictly decreases the value of the potential and a state corresponding to
a local minimum of the potential will eventually be reached; this corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Monderer and Shapley [18] proved that any game that admits such a cost-revealing (or exact) potential
function is isomorphic to a congestion game.
The existence of a potential function allows us to view the problem of computing a pure Nash equilib-
rium as a local search problem [13], i.e., as the problem of computing a local minimum of the potential
function. Fabrikant et al. [14] proved that the problem is PLS-complete (informally, as hard as it could be
given that there is an associated potential function). This negative result applies to symmetric congestion
games as well as to non-symmetric network congestion games. Ackermann et al. [1] studied the impact
of combinatorial structure of congestion games to complexity and extended such negative results to games
with linear latency functions. One consequence of PLS-completeness results is that almost all the states of
the game are such that any sequence of players’ improvement moves that originates from these states must
be exponentially long (in terms of the number of players) in order to reach a pure Nash equilibrium. Effi-
cient algorithms are known only for special cases. For example, in symmetric network congestion games,
1Actually, approximate pure Nash equilibria may be more desirable as solution concepts in practical decision making settings
since they can accommodate small modeling inaccuracies due to uncertainty (e.g., see the arguments in [9]).
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Fabrikant et al. [14] show that the Rosenthal’s potential function can be (globally) minimized efficiently by
a flow computation.
The above negative results have led to the study of the complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. A
ρ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state, from which no player has an incentive to deviate so that
she decreases her cost by a factor larger than ρ. Skopalik and Vo¨cking [22] show that, in general, the
problem is still PLS-complete for any polynomially computable ρ. Efficient algorithms are known only for
special cases. For symmetric congestion games, Chien and Sinclair [8] prove that the (1 + ǫ)-improvement
dynamics converges to a (1 + ǫ)-approximate Nash equilibrium after a polynomial number of steps; this
result holds under additional mild assumptions on the latency functions (a “bounded jump” property) and the
participation of the players in the dynamics. Skopalik and Vo¨cking [22] prove that this approach cannot be
generalized. They present non-symmetric congestion games with latency functions satisfying the bounded-
jump property, so that every sequence of approximate improvement moves from a given initial state to
an approximate equilibrium is exponentially long. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [12] present algorithms
for the broader class of anonymous games assuming that the number of players’ strategies is constant; for
congestion games, this assumption is very restrictive. Efficient algorithms for approximate equilibria have
been recently obtained for other classes of games such as constraint satisfaction [4, 19], network formation
[2], and facility location games [5].
In light of these negative results, several authors have considered other properties of the dynamics of
congestion games. The papers [3, 15] consider the question of whether efficient states (in the sense that
the total cost of the players, or social cost, is small compared to the optimum one) can be reached by
best-response moves. Recall that such states are not necessary approximate Nash equilibria. Fanelli et al.
[15] proved that congestion games with linear latency functions converge to states that approximate the
optimal social cost within a constant factor after an almost linear (in the number of players) number of
best response moves under mild assumptions on the participation of each player in the dynamics. Negative
results in [3] indicate that these assumptions are necessary in order to obtain convergence in subexponential
time. However, Awerbuch et al. [3] show that using almost unrestricted sequences of (1 + ǫ)-improvement
best-response moves in congestion games with polynomial latency functions, the players rapidly converge
to efficient states. Similar approaches have been followed in the context of other games as well, such as
multicast [6, 7], cut [11], and valid-utility games [17].
A notion that is historically related to congestion games (but rather loosely connected to our work) is that
of the price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16]. The price of anarchy captures
the impact of selfishness on efficiency and is defined as the worst-case ratio of the social cost in any pure
Nash equilibrium and the social optimum (see [21] and the references therein for tight bounds on congestion
games). Christodoulou et al. [10] extended the notion of the price of anarchy to approximate equilibria and
provided tight bounds for congestion games with polynomial latency functions.
Our contribution. We present the first polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate pure
Nash equilibria in non-symmetric congestion games with polynomial latency functions of constant maxi-
mum degree. In particular, our algorithm computes (2 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion
games with linear latency functions, and dO(d) approximate equilibria for polynomial latency functions of
maximum degree d. The algorithm is surprisingly simple. Essentially, starting from a specific initial state,
it computes a sequence of best-response player moves of length that is bounded by a polynomial in the
number of players and 1/ǫ. To the best of our knowledge, the existence of such short sequences was not
known before and is interesting in itself. The sequence consists of phases so that the players that participate
in each phase experience costs that are polynomially related. This is crucial in order to obtain convergence
in polynomial time. Another interesting part of our algorithm is that, within each phase, it coordinates the
best response moves according to two different (but simple) criteria; this is the main tool that guarantees that
the effect of a phase to previous ones is negligible and, eventually, an approximate equilibrium is reached.
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The parameters used by the algorithm and its approximation guarantee have a nice relation to properties of
Rosenthal’s potential function. Our bounds are marginally higher than the worst-case ratio of the potential
value at an almost exact pure Nash equilibrium over the globally optimum potential value.
We remark that, following the classical definition of polynomial latency functions in the literature, we
assume that they have non-negative coefficients. We show that this is a necessary limitation. In particular,
by significantly extending the reduction of [22], we prove that the problem of computing a ρ-approximate
equilibrium in congestion games with linear latency functions with negative offsets is PLS-complete. This
negative statement also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with non-negative coefficients
and maximum degree that is polynomial in the number of players.
Roadmap. We begin with definitions and preliminary results and observations in Section 2. The description
of the algorithm then appears in Section 3. The analysis of the algorithm is presented in Section 4. We
conclude with a discussion that includes the statement of our PLS-completeness result and open problems
in Section 5. Due to lack of space, many proofs have been put in appendix.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
A congestion game G is represented by the tuple (N,E, (Σu)u∈N , (fe)e∈E). There is a set of n players
N = {1, 2, ..., n} and a set of resources E. Each player u has a set of available strategies Σu; each strategy
su in Σu consists of a non-empty set of resources, i.e., su ⊆ 2E . A snapshot of strategies, with one strategy
per player, is called a state and is represented by a vector of players’ strategies, e.g., S = (s1, s2, ..., sn).
Each resource e ∈ E has a latency function fe : N 7→ R which denotes the latency incurred to the players
using resource e; this latency depends on the number of players whose strategies include the particular
resource. For a state S, let us define ne(S) to be the number of players that use resource e in S, i.e.,
ne(S) = |{u ∈ N : e ∈ su}|. Then, the latency incurred by resource e to the players that use it is
fe(ne(S)). The cost of a player u at a state S is the total latency she experiences at the resources in her
strategy su, i.e., cu(S) =
∑
e∈su
fe(ne(S)). We mainly consider congestion games in which the resources
have polynomial latency functions with non-negative coefficients. More precisely, the latency function of
resource e is fe(x) =
∑d
k=0 ae,kx
k with ae,k ≥ 0. The special case of linear latency functions (i.e., d = 1)
is of particular interest. Observe that for polynomials with non-negative coefficients and maximum degree
d, we have fe(x+ 1) ≤ 2dfe(x) and fe(x) ≤ ndfe(1) for every positive integer x.
Players act selfishly; each of them aims to select a strategy that minimizes her cost, given the strategies
of the other players. Given a state S = (s1, s2, ..., sn) and a strategy s′u for player u, we denote by (S−u, s′u)
the state obtained from S when player u deviates to strategy s′u. For a strategy S, an improvement move
(or, simply, a move) for player u is the deviation to any strategy s′u that (strictly) decreases her cost, i.e.,
cu(S−u, s
′
u) < cu(S). For q ≥ 1, such a move is called a q-move if it satisfies cu(S−u, s′u) <
cu(S)
q
. A
best-response move is a move that minimizes the cost of the player (of course, given the strategies of the
other players). So, from state S, a move of player u to strategy su is a best-response move (and is denoted
by BRu(S)) when cu(S−u, s′u) = mins∈Σu cu(S−u, s). With some abuse in notation, we use BRu(0) to
denote the best-response of player u assuming that no other player participates in the game.
A state S is called a pure Nash equilibrium (or, simply, an equilibrium) when cu(S) ≤ cu(S−u, s′u) for
every player u ∈ N and every strategy s′u ∈ Σu. In this case, we say that no player has (any incentive to
make) a move. Similarly, a state is called a q-approximate pure Nash equilibrium (henceforth called, simply,
a q-approximate equilibrium) when no player has a q-move.
Congestion games are potential games. They admit a potential function Φ : ∏uΣu 7→ R, defined
over all states of the game, with the following property: for any two state S and (S−u, s′u) that differ
only in the strategy of player u, it holds that Φ(S−u, s′u) − Φ(S) = cu(S−u, s′u) − cu(S). Clearly, local
minima of the potential function corresponds to states that are pure Nash equilibria. The function Φ(S) =
4
∑
e∈E
∑ne(S)
j=1 fe(j) (first used by Rosenthal [20]) is such a potential function. A nice property of this
particular potential function is that the potential value at a state lies between the sum of latencies incurred
by the resources and the total cost of the players.
Claim 2.1 For any state S of a congestion game with a set of players N , a set of resource E, and latency
functions (fe)e∈E , it holds that
∑
e∈E
fe(ne(S)) ≤ Φ(S) ≤
∑
u∈N
cu(S).
In the rest of the paper, the term potential function is used specifically for Rosenthal’s potential function.
We now present a simple observation which will be used extensively in the analysis of our algorithm.
Consider a sequence of moves in which only players from a subset F of N participate while players inN \F
are frozen to their strategies throughout the whole sequence. We will think of this sequence as a sequence of
moves in a subgame played among the players of F on the resources of E. In this subgame, each player in
F has the same set of strategies as in the original game; players of N \F do not participate in the subgame,
although they contribute to the latency of the resources at which they have been frozen. Thus, the modified
latency function of resource e is then fFe (x) = fe(x + te), where te stands for the number of players of
N \F on resource e. Then, it is not hard to see that the subgame is a congestion game as well. Clearly, if fe
is a linear (respectively, polynomial of maximum degree d) function with non-negative coefficients, so is fFe
and the bound established in Lemma 2.3 (respectively, Lemma 2.4, see below) also holds for the subgame.
From the perspective of a player in F , nothing changes. At any state S, such a player experiences the same
cost in both games and therefore has the same incentive to move, regardless whether we view S as a state of
the original game or the subgame. However, one should be careful with the definition of the potential for the
subgame (denoted by ΦF ) and use the modified latency functions fFe instead of fe. Throughout the paper,
for a subset of players F ⊆ N , we use the notation nFe (S) to denote the number of players in F that use
resource e at state S.
Claim 2.2 Let S be a state of the congestion game with a set of players N and let F ⊆ N . Then, Φ(S) ≤
ΦF (S) + ΦN\F (S) and Φ(S) ≥ ΦF (S).
The approximation guarantee of our algorithm for congestion games of a particular class (e.g., with
linear latency functions) is strongly related to the worst-case ratio (among all congestion games in the class)
between the potential of an approximate equilibrium (the factor of approximation may be picked to be close
to 1) and the minimum potential value. Below, we present upper bounds on this quantity; these upper bounds
are used as parameters by our algorithm. The next lemma deals with the case of linear latency functions.
Lemma 2.3 Consider a congestion game with linear latency functions. Let q ∈ [1, 2) and let S be a
q-approximate equilibrium. Then, Φ(S) ≤ 2q2−qΦ(S
∗), where S∗ is a state of the game with minimum
potential.
Our next (rather rough) bound applies to polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d. It is
obtained by observing that the desired ratio is at most (d+1) times the known upper bound of dO(d) for the
price of anarchy of 2-approximate equilibria [10].
Lemma 2.4 Consider a congestion game with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d, where
d ≥ 2. Let q ∈ [1, 2] and let S be a q-approximate equilibrium. Then, Φ(S)/Φ(S∗) ∈ dO(d), where S∗ is a
state of the game with the minimum potential.
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3 The algorithm
In this section we describe our algorithm. It takes as input a congestion game G with n players and poly-
nomial latency functions of maximum degree d and produces a state of G. The algorithm uses a constant
parameter ψ > 0 and two more parameters q and p. Denote by θd(q) the upper bound on the worst-case ratio
(among all possible congestion games with polynomial latency functions of degree d) between the potential
of any q-approximate equilibrium and the minimum potential value that are provided by Lemmas 2.3 and
2.4, i.e., θ1(q) = 2q2−q and θd(q) = d
O(d) for d ≥ 2. We set the parameter q to be slightly larger than 1 (in
particular, q = 1+n−ψ) and parameter p to be slightly larger than θd(q) (in particular, p =
(
1
θd(q)
− nψ
)−1
).
The algorithm considers the optimistic cost ℓu of each player u, given by ℓu = minsu∈Σu
∑
e∈su
fe(1);
this is the minimum cost that u could experience assuming that no other player participates in the game. Let
ℓmax denote the maximum optimistic cost among all players. The algorithm partitions the players into blocks
B1, B2, . . . , Bm; blockBi contains player u if and only if ℓu ∈ (bi+1, bi], where bi = ℓmax
(
2d+1n2ψ+d+1
)−i+1
.
It initializes each player u to choose strategy BRu(0). Then, the algorithm coordinates best-response moves
by the players as follows. By considering i in the increasing order (from 1 to m − 1), it executes phase i
provided that block Bi is non-empty. When at phase i, the algorithm lets players in Bi make best-response
p-moves and players in Bi+1 make best-response q-moves while this is possible. The algorithm is depicted
in the following table.
input : A congestion game G = (N,E, (Σi)i∈N , (fe)e∈E) with n players and polynomial
latency functions of maximum degree d
output: A state of G
1 Set q = 1 + n−ψ and p =
(
1
θd(q)
− n−ψ
)−1
;
2 foreach u ∈ N do set ℓu = cu (BRu(0));
3 Set ℓmin = minu∈N ℓu, ℓmax = maxu∈N ℓu, and set
m = 1 + ⌈log2d+1n2ψ+d+1 (ℓmax/ℓmin)⌉;
4 (Implicitly) partition players into blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bm, such that
u ∈ Bi ⇔ ℓu ∈
(
ℓmax
(
2d+1n2ψ+d+1
)−i
, ℓmax
(
2d+1n2ψ+d+1
)−i+1];
5 foreach u ∈ N do set u to play the strategy su ← BRu(0);
6 for phase i← 1 to m− 1 such that Bi 6= ∅ do
7 while there exists a player u that either belongs to Bi and has a p-move or belongs to
Bi+1 and has a q-move do
8 u deviates to the best-response strategy su ← BRu(s1, . . . , sn).
9 end
10 end
Algorithm 1: Computing approximate equilibria in congestion games.
We remark that step 2 partitions the players into at most n non-empty blocks. Then, the for-loop at lines
6-10 enumerates only phases i such that Bi is non-empty, i.e., it considers at most n phases.
We conclude this section with two remarks that will be treated formally in the next section. First, the
selection of the boundaries of each block to be polynomially-related is crucial in order to bound the number
of steps. Second, but more importantly, we notice that each player in block Bi does not move after phase
i. At the end of this phase, the algorithm guarantees that none of these players has a p-move to make. The
most challenging part of the analysis will be to show that the players do not have any p(1 + 4n−ψ)-move to
make after any subsequent phase. In this respect, the definition of the phases, the selection of parameter p
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and its relation to θd(q) play the crucial role.
4 Analysis of the algorithm
This section is devoted to proving our main result.
Theorem 4.1 For every constant ψ > 0, the algorithm computes a ρd-approximate equilibrium for every
congestion game with polynomial latency functions of constant maximum degree d and n players, where
ρ1 = 2 +O(n
−ψ) and ρd ∈ dO(d). Moreover, the number of player moves is at most polynomial in n.
Proof. We denote by S0 the state computed at step 5 of the algorithm (player u plays strategy BRu(0))
and by Si the state after the execution of phase i for i ≥ 1. Within each phase i, we denote by Ri the set
of players that make at least one move during the phase. Recall that the players of block Bi are those with
optimistic cost ℓu ∈ (bi+1, bi] and that bi = 2d+1n2ψ+d+1bi+1, for i = 1, ...,m.
The proof of the theorem follows by a series of lemmas. The most crucial one is Lemma 4.3 where
we show that the potential ΦRi(Si−1) of the subgame among the players in Ri at the beginning of phase
i ≥ 2 is significantly smaller than bi. In general, players that move during phase i experience cost that
is polynomially related to bi and each of them decreases her cost (and, consequently, the potential) by a
quantity that is also polynomially related to bi. This argument is used in Lemma 4.4 (together with Lemma
4.3) in order to show that the number of steps of the algorithm is polynomial in n. More importantly, Lemma
4.3 is used in the proof of Lemma 4.5 in order to show that players in block Bi are not affected significantly
after phase i (notice that players in Bi do not move after phase i). Using this lemma, we conclude in Lemma
4.6 that the players are in a p(1 + 4n−ψ)-approximate equilibrium after the execution of the algorithm. The
statement of the theorem then follows by taking into account the parameters of the algorithm.
Let us warm up with the following lemma (to be used in the proof of Lemma 4.3) that relates the potential
ΦRi(S
i) with the latency the players in Ri experience when they make their last move within phase i.
Lemma 4.2 Let c(u) denote the cost of player u ∈ Ri just after making her last move within phase i. Then,
ΦRi(S
i) ≤
∑
u∈Ri
c(u).
We now present the key lemma of our proof.
Lemma 4.3 For every phase i ≥ 2, it holds that ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ bi2dnψ .
Proof. Assume the contrary, that ΦRi(Si−1) > bi2dnψ . We will show that state S
i−1 would not be a q-
approximate equilibrium for the players in Ri ∩ Bi, which contradicts the definition of phase i − 1 of the
algorithm.
First observe that a player u in Bi+1 is assigned to the strategy BRu(0) in the beginning of the algorithm
and does not move during the first i− 1 phases. Hence, by the definition of the latency functions, she does
not experience a cost more than ndbi+1 at state Si−1. Hence, the potential ΦRi∩Bi+1(Si−1), which is upper-
bounded by the total cost of players in Ri ∩Bi+1, satisfies
ΦRi∩Bi+1(S
i−1) ≤ nd+1bi+1. (1)
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We now use the fact ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ ΦRi∩Bi(Si−1) + ΦRi∩Bi+1(Si−1) (see Claim 2.2), inequality (1),
and the assumption ΦRi(Si−1) > bi2dnψ to obtain
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1) ≥ ΦRi(S
i−1)− ΦRi∩Bi+1(S
i−1)
>
bi
2dnψ
− nd+1bi+1
=
(
2d+1n2ψ+d+1
2dnψ
− nd+1
)
bi+1
≥ nψ+d+1bi+1. (2)
Further, we consider the dynamics of the subgame among the players in Ri at phase i. For each player u
in Ri, we denote by c(u) the cost player u experiences just after she makes her last move in phase i. Observe
that every player u in Bi ∩ Ri decreases the potential of the subgame among the players of Ri by at least
(p− 1)c(u) when she performs her last p-move. Hence,
(p− 1)
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi
c(u) ≤ ΦRi(S
i−1)− ΦRi(S
i)
≤ ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1) + ΦRi∩Bi+1(S
i−1)− ΦRi(S
i)
≤ ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1) + nd+1bi+1 − ΦRi(S
i)
<
(
1 +
1
nψ
)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1)− ΦRi(S
i). (3)
The last three inequalities follow by Claim 2.2 and inequalities (1) and (2), respectively.
Furthermore, since each player u in Ri ∩ Bi+1 plays a best-response during phase i, her cost after her
last move will be at most the cost she would experience by deviating to strategy BRu(0), which is at most
ndbi+1. Then, the total cost of the players of Ri ∩ Bi+1 is at most nd+1bi+1. Now, using Lemma 4.2, the
last observation, inequalities (3) and (2), we obtain
ΦRi(S
i) ≤
∑
u∈Ri
c(u)
=
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi+1
c(u) +
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi
c(u)
< nd+1bi+1 +
1
p− 1
(
1 +
1
nψ
)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1)−
1
p− 1
ΦRi(S
i)
≤
1
p− 1
(
1 +
p
nψ
)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1)−
1
p− 1
ΦRi(S
i)
which implies that
ΦRi(S
i) <
(
1
p
+
1
nψ
)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1). (4)
Now, let S∗ be the state in which the players in Ri ∩ Bi play their strategies in Si and the players in
Ri∩Bi+1 (as well as every other player) play their strategies in Si−1. Consider the deviation of each player
u in Ri ∩ Bi+1 from her strategy in Si to her strategy BRu(0) in S∗. Recall that the cost each player u in
Ri ∩Bi+1 experiences when playing strategy BRu(0) is at most ndbi+1 which means that the increase her
deviation incurs to the potential of the subgame among the players in Ri is at most ndbi+1. Hence,
ΦRi(S
∗) ≤ ΦRi(S
i) + nd+1bi+1. (5)
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Now, using the fact that ΦRi∩Bi(S∗) ≤ ΦRi(S∗), together with inequalities (5), (4), and (2), we have
ΦRi∩Bi(S
∗) ≤ ΦRi(S
∗)
≤ ΦRi(S
i) + nd+1bi+1
<
(
1
p
+
2
nψ
)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1)
=
1
θd(q)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1).
The last inequality implies that the global minimum of the potential value of the subgame among the
players of Ri ∩ Bi (when all other players are frozen to their strategies in Si−1) is strictly smaller than
1
θd(q)
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1). Due to the definition of θd(q) and Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, this contradicts the fact that
Si−1 is a q-approximate equilibrium for the players in Ri ∩Bi. ⊓⊔
We are ready to bound the number of best-response moves. As a matter of fact, our upper bound is
dominated by the number of best-response moves in the very first phase of the algorithm. We remark that a
weaker result could be obtained without resorting to Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4 The algorithm terminates after at most O (n5ψ+3d+3) best-response moves.
Proof. We will upper-bound the total number of moves during the execution of the algorithm. After the
first n best-response moves in line 5, the number of phases executed by the algorithm is at most n. At the
beginning of the first phase, the latency of any player in R1 is at most ndb1 (due to the definition of block
B1 and of the latency functions). Hence, ΦR1(S0) ≤
∑
u∈R1
cu(S
0) ≤ nd+1b1. The minimum latency
experienced by any player in R1 is at least b3, so each move in this step decreases the potential ΦR1 by at
least (q − 1)b3. So the total number of moves is at most n
d+1b1
(q−1)b3
= 22d+2n5ψ+3d+3.
At the beginning of any other phase i ≥ 2, we have that ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ bi2dnψ (by Lemma 4.3). The
minimum latency experienced by any player in Ri is at least bi+2, so each move in this step decreases the
potential ΦRi by at least (q−1)bi+2. So the total number of moves is at most bi2dnψ(q−1)b3 = 2
d+2n4ψ+2d+2.
In total, we have O
(
n5ψ+3d+3
)
best-response moves. ⊓⊔
The proof of the following lemma strongly relies on Lemma 4.3. Intuitively, Lemma 4.3 implies that
the cost experienced by any player of Ri while moving during phase i is considerably lower than the cost of
players in blocks B1, . . . , Bi−1 (who are not supposed to move anymore). The latter means that, for every
player u in B1, . . . , Bi−1, after phase i, neither the cost of u may increase considerably, nor the cost that u
could experience by a possible deviation may decrease considerably.
Lemma 4.5 Let u be a player in the block Bt, where t ≤ m− 2. Let s′u be a strategy different from the one
assigned to u by the algorithm at the end of phase t. Then, for each phase i ≥ t, it holds that
cu(S
i) ≤ p · cu(S
i
−u, s
′
u) +
p+ 1
nψ
i∑
k=t+1
bk.
Proof. We will prove the lemma using induction on i. For i = t, the claim follows by the definition of
phase i of the algorithm. Assume that the claim is true for a phase i with t ≤ i ≤ m− 2. In the following,
we show that the claim is true for the phase i+ 1 as well.
First, we show that if
cu(S
i+1) ≤ cu(S
i) +
bi+1
nψ
(6)
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and
cu(S
i
−u, s
′
u) ≤ cu(S
i+1
−u , s
′
u) +
bi+1
nψ
(7)
then the claim holds. By the hypothesis of induction, we have
cu(S
i) ≤ p · cu(S
i
−u, s
′
u) +
p+ 1
nψ
i∑
k=t+1
bk.
Combining the above three inequalities, we obtain that
cu(S
i+1) ≤ cu(S
i) +
bi+1
nψ
≤ p · cu(S
i
−u, s
′
u) +
p+ 1
nψ
i∑
k=t+1
bk +
bi+1
nψ
≤ p · cu(S
i+1
−u , s
′
u) +
p+ 1
nψ
i+1∑
k=t+1
bk,
as desired.
In order to complete the proof of the inductive step we are left to prove (6) and (7). We do so by proving
that if one of these two inequalities does not hold, this would violate the statement of Lemma 4.3.
Assume that (6) does not hold, i.e., cu(Si+1) > cu(Si) + bi+1nψ for some player u of block Bt, where
t ≤ i. We will show that the potential ΦRi+1(Si+1) at state Si+1 of the subgame among the players in Ri+1
is larger than bi+1
2dnψ
. Since the potential decreases during phase i+ 1, ΦRi+1(Si) should also be larger than
bi+1
2dnψ
, contradicting Lemma 4.3. Indeed, since player u does not move during phase i + 1, the increase in
her cost from state Si to state Si+1 implies the existence of a set of resources C ⊆ su in her strategy with
the following properties: each resource e ∈ C is also used by at least one player of Ri+1 in state Si+1 and,
furthermore,
∑
e∈C fe(ne(S
i+1)) >
bi+1
nψ
. By Claim 2.1, we obtain that ΦRi+1(Si+1) >
bi+1
nψ
.
Similarly, assume that (7) does not hold for a player u of block Bt and a strategy s′u that is different
from su, the strategy assigned to u in phase t, i.e., cu(Si−u, s′u) > cu(Si+1−u , s′u) +
bi+1
nψ
. Recall that player
u does not move during phase i + 1. This implies that there exists a set of resources C ⊆ s′u with the
following properties: each resource e ∈ C is used by at least one player of Ri+1 in state Si and, furthermore,∑
e∈C fe(ne(S
i
−u, s
′
u)) ≥
bi+1
nψ
. Hence, by Claim 2.1 and the definition of the latency functions, we have
ΦR+1(S
i) ≥
∑
e∈C fe(ne(S
i)) ≥
∑
e∈C
1
2d
fe(ne(S
i
−u, s
′
u)) >
bi+1
2dnψ
. Again, this contradicts Lemma 4.3.
Hence, (6) and (7) hold and the proof of the inductive step is complete. ⊓⊔
The next lemma follows easily by Lemma 4.5, the definition of bi’s, and the definition of the last phase
of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.6 The state computed by the algorithm is a p
(
1 + 4
nψ
)
-approximate equilibrium.
Proof. We have to show that in the state Sm−1, computed by the algorithm after the last phase, no player
has an incentive to deviate to another strategy in order to decrease her cost by a factor of p
(
1 + 4
nψ
)
. The
claim is certainly true for the players in the blocks Bm−1 and Bm by the definition of the last phase of the
algorithm. Let u be a player in block Bt with t ≤ m − 2 and let s′u be any strategy different from the one
assigned to u by the algorithm after phase t. We apply Lemma 4.5 to player u. By the definition of bi’s, we
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have
∑m
k=t+1 bk ≤ 2bt+1. Also, cu(S
m−1
−u , s
′
u) ≥ bt+1, since u belongs to block Bt. Hence, Lemma 4.5
implies that
cu(S
m−1) ≤ p · cu(S
m−1
−u , s
′
u) +
2(p + 1)
nψ
cu(S
m−1
−u , s
′
u)
≤ p
(
1 +
4
nψ
)
cu(S
m−1
−u , s
′
u),
as desired. The last inequality follows since p ≥ 1. ⊓⊔
By the definition of the parameters q and p in our algorithm, we obtain that the state computed is a
ρd-approximate equilibrium with
ρd ≤
(
1
θd(q)
− n−ψ
)−1(
1 +
4
nψ
)
,
where θ1(q) = 2q2−q , θd(q) ∈ d
O(d) and q = 1 + n−ψ. By making simple calculations, we obtain that
ρ1 ≤ 2 +O(n
−ψ) and ρd ∈ dO(d). This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1. ⊓⊔
5 Discussion and open problems
We remark that the number of best response moves computed by our algorithm depends neither on the
number of the resources nor on the number of strategies per player. In fact, our algorithm delegates to the
players the computation of their best-response move; the overall running time then depends also on the time
required by the players to compute a best-response move from any state of the game and (pseudo-)state 0.
Of course, the players are expected to be able to do this computation efficiently.
The guarantee of our algorithm depends strongly on the fact that the latency functions have non-negative
coefficients. Is this a severe limitation? We answer this question negatively in the next theorem where we
prove that the problem of computing approximate equilibria is PLS-complete for congestion games with
linear latency functions that have negative offsets (but incurring non-negative latency to any player using the
corresponding resource).
Theorem 5.1 Finding an ρ-approximate equilibrium in a congestion game with linear laency functions with
negative coefficients is PLS-complete, for every polynomial-time computable ρ > 1.
The reduction yields a congestion game in which every resource is contained in strategies of at most two
players. It can also be turned into a congestion game with polynomial latency functions that have degree
polynomial in n (see Section B).
Our work reveals several open problems. The most challenging one is whether the guarantee for ap-
proximate equilibria that can be computed efficiently can be improved. For example, can we compute
(1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibria in congestion games with linear latency functions in polynomial time for
every (polynomially small) ǫ > 0? We believe that this is not the case and our algorithm is close to optimal
in this sense. It would be very interesting to see how the best possible approximation guarantee relates to
the worst-case ratio of the potential at an almost exact equilibrium over the minimum potential. Here, we
point out that we have examples of congestion games for which the upper bound of 2, provided by Lemma
2.3, is tight when q approaches 1. Extending this question to polynomial latencies is interesting as well.
Note that a nice consequence of our work is that, besides being approximate equilibria, the states computed
have low price of anarchy as well (e.g., at least 7.33 + O(ǫ) for linear latency functions according to the
bounds in [10]). Providing improved guarantees for the social cost of approximate equilibria that can be
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computed efficiently or related trade-offs is another interesting line of research. Finally, we strongly believe
that our techniques could be applicable to other potential games as well. Typical examples include constraint
satisfaction games such as the cut and parity games studied in [4]; we plan to consider such games in future
work.
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A Proofs omitted from Sections 2 and 4
Proof of Claim 2.1. The first inequality follows easily by the definition of function Φ. The second one
can be obtained by the following derivation:
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=1
fe(j)
≤
∑
e∈E
ne(S) · fe
(
ne(S)
)
=
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈su
·fe
(
ne(S)
)
=
∑
u∈N
cu(S).
⊓⊔
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Proof of Claim 2.2. We use the definition of the potential function for the original game and the subgames,
the definitions of the modified latency functions fFe (x) = fe(x+n
N\F
e (S)) and fN\Fe (x) = fe(x+nFe (S)),
and the equality ne(S) = nFe (S) + n
N\F
e (S) to obtain
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=1
fe(j)
=
∑
e∈E
nFe (S)∑
j=1
fe(j) +
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=nFe (S)+1
fe(j)
≤
∑
e∈E
nFe (S)∑
j=1
fe(j + n
N\F
e (S)) +
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=nFe (S)+1
fe(j)
=
∑
e∈E
nFe (S)∑
j=1
fFe (j) +
∑
e∈E
n
N\F
e (S)∑
j=1
fe(j + n
F
e (S))
=
∑
e∈E
nFe (S)∑
j=1
fFe (j) +
∑
e∈E
n
N\F
e (S)∑
j=1
fN\Fe (j)
= ΦF (S) + ΦN\F (S),
as desired for the first part of the claim. For the second part, we have
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=1
fe(j)
≥
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=n
N\F
e (S)+1
fe(j)
=
∑
e∈E
nFe (S)∑
j=1
fe(j + n
N\F
e (S))
=
∑
e∈E
nFe (S)∑
j=1
fFe (j)
= ΦF (S).
⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 2.3. In the proof, we will need the following technical claim.
Claim A.1 For every non-negative integers x, y, it holds true xy ≤ 12x
2 − 12x+ y
2
.
Proof. For x = 1, the claim clearly holds. Otherwise, observe that 12x
2− 12x ≥
1
4x
2
. Then 0 ≤ (x2 − y)
2 =
1
4x
2 + y2 − xy ≤ 12x
2 − 12x+ y
2 − xy and claim follows. ⊓⊔
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For each player u we denote by su and s∗u the strategies she uses at states S and S∗, respectively. Using
the q-approximate equilibrium condition, that is cu(S) ≤ q · cu(S−u, s∗u), we obtain∑
e∈su
(ae,1 · ne(S) + ae,0) ≤ q
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1 · ne(S−u, s
∗
u) + ae,0)
for each player u ∈ N . Summing over all players, we get that their total cost is∑
u∈N
∑
e∈su
(ae,1 · ne(S) + ae,0) ≤ q
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1 · ne(S−u, s
∗
u) + ae,0)
≤ q
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈s∗u
(ae,1 · (ne(S) + 1) + ae,0)
= q
∑
e∈E
(ae,1 · ne(S
∗)(ne(S) + 1) + ae,0 · ne(S
∗)) (8)
In the following, we use the definitions of the potential and the latency functions, the fact that q ≥ 1,
inequality (8)
(
ne(S) · ne(S
∗) ≤ 12ne(S)
2 − 12ne(S) + ne(S
∗)2
)
, and Claim A.1 to obtain
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
j=1
fe(j)
=
∑
e∈E
(
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S)
2 +
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S) + ae,0 · ne(S)
)
=
∑
e∈E
(
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S)
2 +
1
2
ae,0 · ne(S)
)
+
∑
e∈E
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S) +
∑
e∈E
1
2
ae,0 · ne(S)
≤
1
2
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈su
(
ae,1 · ne(S) + ae,0
)
+
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,1ne(S) +
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,0ne(S)
≤
q
2
∑
e∈E
(
ae,1 · ne(S
∗)(ne(S) + 1) + ae,0 · ne(S
∗)
)
+
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,1 · ne(S) +
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,0 · ne(S)
≤
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,1
(
1
2
ne(S)
2 +
1
2
ne(S) + ne(S
∗)2 + ne(S
∗)
)
+
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,0 · ne(S
∗) +
q
2
∑
e∈E
ae,0 · ne(S)
≤
q
2
∑
e∈E
(
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S)
2 +
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S) + ae,0 · ne(S)
)
+q
∑
e∈E
(
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S
∗)2 +
1
2
ae,1 · ne(S
∗) + ae,0 · ne(S
∗)
)
=
q
2
Φ(S) + qΦ(S∗),
and, equivalently, Φ(S) ≤ 2q2−qΦ(S
∗). ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Observe that Φ(S) ≤
∑
u∈N cu(S) (see Claim 2.1). We will also show that
Φ(S∗) ≥ 1
d+1
∑
u∈N cu(S
∗). The desired bound then follows by the fact that the price of anarchy of 2-
approximate equilibria is at most dO(d). Notice that the price of anarchy is at least
∑
u∈N cu(S)/
∑
u∈N cu(S
∗).
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We will use the property
∫ y
0 f(x)dx ≤
∑y
j=1 f(j), that holds for every non-decreasing function f :
[0, y]→ R and integer y ≥ 1. We prove the desired inequality as follows.
Φ(S∗) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S∗)∑
j=1
fe(j)
≥
∑
e∈E
∫ ne(S∗)
0
fe(x)dx
=
∑
e∈E
∫ ne(S∗)
0
d∑
k=0
ae,k · x
kdx
=
∑
e∈E
d∑
k=0
ae,k
k + 1
ne(S
∗)k+1
≥
1
d+ 1
∑
e∈E
d∑
k=0
ae,k · ne(S
∗)k+1
=
1
d+ 1
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗)fe(S
∗)
=
1
d+ 1
∑
u∈N
cu(S
∗).
⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We denote by su the strategy of player u at state Si. We rank the players that
use resource e in Si according to the timing of their last moves (using consecutive integers 1, 2, ...). We
denote by ranke(u) the number of players in Ri with the smaller ranking than u on resource e. Then, we get
c(u) ≥
∑
e∈su
fRie (ranke(u)), since any resource e in su is occupied by at least ranke(u) players from Ri
at state Si: u and the players with ranks 1, 2, ..., ranke(u) − 1 that made their last move before u. Hence,
by the definition of the potential function (expressed using the modified latency functions for the subgame
among the players of Ri), we have
ΦRi(S
i) =
∑
e∈E
n
Ri
e (S
i)∑
j=1
fRie (j)
=
∑
e∈E
∑
u∈Ri:e∈su
fRie (ranke(u))
=
∑
u∈Ri
∑
e∈su
fRie (ranke(u))
≤
∑
u∈Ri
c(u),
and the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
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B Proof of Theorem 5.1
We prove the theorem by reworking the reduction in [22]. From now on, we refer to it as the original or old
construction or proof. In the following, we outline our modifications in the original construction (in Section
B.1) and prove the correctness of the new one (in Section B.2). Finally, we give a detailed description of the
new construction in Section B.3.
Recall that the original proof is a reduction from the PLS-complete problem FLIP which is the following:
Definition B.1 An instance of the problem FLIP consists of a boolean circuit C with n inputs and m outputs.
A feasible solution is a bit vector x1, . . . , xn and the objective value is defined as c(x) =
∑k
i=1 yi2
i−1 where
y is the output produced by C with input x. The neighborhood N(x) of solution x is the set of bit vectors x′
of length n that differs from x in one bit. The objective is to find a local minimum.
The proof describes a transformation of C into a congestion game G(C) which has the property that every
pure Nash equilibrium of G(C) corresponds to a local optimum of C . Furthermore, it is ensured that every
equilibrium is also an α-approximate equilibrium for α ≥ max{ρ, 2} by ensuring that every strategy change
of a player decreases her latency by a factor of at least α.
Our new construction has the additional property that every resource is part of at most two players’
strategies. Therefore, it suffices to specify only the latency values for one and two players for each resource.
For the sake of readability, we depict latency functions by the two values a/b, which correspond to fe(1) = a
and fe(2) = b. This can obviously be turned into a linear function by setting fe(x) = (b− a)x+ 2a− b.
To simplify the presentation, there are many latency functions with fe(1) = 0. However, we can set
fe(1) = 1 and scale all other latency values by a factor of |E|α. This modification does not change the
players’ preferences and, by choosing α ≥ 2ρ, the theorem still holds. Thus, the latency functions can
be described as polynomials with positive coefficients. However, their degree has to be polynomial in the
number of players.
A close look at the original reduction reveals that most of the resources are used by at most two players.
The only resources for which this is not the case are the resources Bit1k of the subgames G(S) and all Lock
resources. Unfortunately, those resources are part of the lockable circuits, the most important feature of
this reduction. We will replace these resources and add new strategies and new players to the game. See
Figures 2 to 6 for a complete description of the players’ strategies, the resources, and latency functions.
B.1 The construction of G(C)
In the original construction, a gate player has two strategies which correspond to the two values of the
output of that gate. Her best response is determined by the players that correspond to the inputs of this gate.
This requires latency functions for the bit resources that are not linear, i.e., latency of 0 for two players and
latency of α2k for three players. We can avoid this, by the following changes:
Instead of one strategy One, a gate player Gi now has two strategies OneA and OneB. If input a of her
gate is 1, her best response is not to choose OneA. If input b of her gate is 1, her best response is not to choose
OneB. As before, choosing Zero is only a best response if both inputs are 1. For gates that have gi as input,
there is no difference between Gi choosing OneA or OneB and the semantics of NAND is preserved by this
construction. The Lock resources that also required nonlinear latency functions in the original construction
are replaced by individual copies for each gate player.
The Lock resources play a central role in the reduction. They ensure that a state is either expensive,
i,.e., some player has latency of at least M , or the state is part of a sequence of states that simulates an
improvement step in the FLIP-instance. We call such a sequence a superstep (see Figure 1).
For each player that uses a Lock resource in the old game, we introduce copies in the new game that are
only used by this player and a new Lock player. A Lock player allocates the new Lock resources of a gate
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1. The controller switches from LockS0 to LockSji,b.
2. All players LockGk of all circuits except Sji,b move (in increasing order) to Unlock.
By moving from her One-strategy to her strategy Changeji,b, player Yj
• triggers player Xi to switch to One or Zero for b = 1 or b = 0, respectively, and
• triggers the players Y1, . . . , Yj−1 to switch to One.
3. After all triggered actions are done and all gates with input yj are unlocked, player Yj can change to
her strategy Checkji,b, and thereby it triggers the Lock players to lock circuit S0 and the controller to
move to LockS0
4. All Lock player of circuit S0 switch to one of their Lock strategies in decreasing order.
5. The controller moves back to LockS0.
6. Player Yj changes to her Zero-strategy and all Lock players of all circuits Sji,b move to their Lock
strategies in decreasing order.
Figure 1: Description of a superstep beginning and ending in a base state.
in such a way that she acts as a proxy between them. The main difference compared to the old construction
is that the Controller cannot lock the circuit herself by allocating the Lock resources. Instead, the new
LockGi players have to change to one of their Lock strategies. By doing so, they set the corresponding
Lock resources free for the Controller, which in turn allows the Controller to move to the strategy that locks
this circuit. Additionally, we ensure that there is no gridlock. That is, the newly added Lock players switch
their strategies whenever needed. For this purpose, there are two kinds of resources that are part of the Lock
players strategies. These resources are TriggerLockGi and TriggerUnlockGi. We add these resources to
strategies of the controller and the Y players to ensure that a sequence of improvement steps corresponding
to a superstep is possible. Furthermore, we allow a Lock player to lock a gate only if its input gates are
already locked. This guarantees that a gate can always change to its correct value.
In the Controller’s strategies, the original Lock resources are replaced by their copies as described above.
Furthermore, the strategy LockS0 contains the resources TriggerLockGk for all gates gk of all circuits. This
ensures that eventually a circuit Sji,b is locked if changing bit xi to b yields enough improvement to switch
yj to 0. In contrast to the old construction, this requires the Controller to have higher latency since the
TriggerLockGk resources may cause latency of α2 for every gate in the circuits Sji,b. We adjust the latency
functions of the resources LockS0 and TriggerController by a factor of β to account for this.
Finally, the Controller now has two reset strategies instead of one in the old construction. This is
necessary in order to ensure that the Y players are actually reset to their One strategies before locking a
circuit.
In the strategies of the X and Y players, the Bit and Lock resources are replaced like in the gate players’
strategies as described above. In addition to that, Y players’ strategies (besides their One strategies) contain
the additional resource ResetDoneYj that they share with the new Reset2 strategy of the Controller. Finally,
the Check strategies contain the TriggerLockGk resources of the Lock player of circuit S0.
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B.2 Proof of correctness
We refrain from repeating the correctness proof of the original construction. Instead, we merely outline its
arguments and point out the parts that have changed due to our modifications. The proof divides the set of
states into several disjoint sets, Z0, . . . , Z6, and shows that all equilibria are contained in one of them, Z0.
The states in Z0 are called base states. These are all inexpensive states in which every Y player plays Zero
or One and the Controller plays LockS0. It then suffices to show that a base state is not an approximate
equilibrium (i.e., there is an improving move) if the bit vector x represented by the input player is not a local
optimum of C .
Lemma B.1 ([22]) None of the states in Z1, . . . , Z4 is an equilibrium.
The proof of the lemma considers the sets one after the other and shows that in each of them there is a player
that has an improving move. In our modified construction, we need to show that none of the resources that
we added or modified prevents such a move.
In a state in Z1 or Z2, Lock players of every circuit Sj
′
i′,b′ with (j
′, i′, b′) 6= (j, i, b) and of circuit S0
play Unlock in equilibrium. This is due to the fact, that their TriggerLockGk resources are not allocated by
another player. This implies that none of the Lock resources of the players Yj , Yj′ (with j′ < j), and Xi
is allocated by a Lock player. Therefore, Z1 and Z2 do not contain equilibria of the modified game. For a
state in Z3, observe that player Yj allocates the resources TriggerLockGk for every gate gk of circuit S0.
In equilibrium, all Lock players of this circuit are playing one of their Lock strategies, which allows for the
Controller to change to LockS0. For a state in Z4 the arguments of the original proof suffice.
Lemma B.2 ([22]) None of the states in Z5 or Z6 is an equilibrium.
Z5 contains the states in which a player has latency of M2 or more. In this case there is always a sequence
of improving moves that lead to a state in Z6. For a state in Z6, we distinguish between two cases depending
on the strategy played by the Controller. If she is on Reset1, all Lock players have an incentive to play
their Unlock strategies and all Y players to play their One strategies. However, this allows the Controller
to change to Reset2 to decrease her latency. If the Controller plays Reset2 and has latency of less than M2,
all Y players play their One strategy. Therefore, in an equilibrium, all Lock player of circuit C0 play one of
their Lock strategies. This, however allows the Controller to change to LockS0.
Lemma B.3 ([22]) Suppose s is a base state in equilibrium. Then, the bit vector x represented by the input
players is a local optimum of C .
In any base state in which x is not a local minimum of C , all Lock players of a circuit Sji,b that has output
1 play one of their Lock strategies in equilibrium. Therefore the controller can change to LockSji,b. ⊓⊔
B.3 Detailed description of G(C)
Recall that β = α2K+1 with K being the total number of gates over all circuits and γ = 2αβ. That is,
α≪ β ≪ γ ≪M .
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Strategies Resources Latencies
LockS0 Lock0 β
BlockS0 0/M
2
For all gates gk of all circuits Sji,b:
TriggerLockGk 0/α
2
For all gates gk of S0:
LockGatek(Controller) of G(S0) 0/M2
LockSji,b TriggerController 1/β
2
BlockSji,b 0/M
2
BlockYj 0/M
2
For all gates gk of Sji,b:
LockGatek(Controller) of G(Sji,b) 0/M
2
Reset1 Reset1 2M
For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
TriggerYj 0/5α
5γj
For all gates gk of all circuits:
TriggerUnlockGk α/α
3
Reset2 Reset2 M
For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
ResetDoneYj 0/M
5
For all gates gk of circuit S0:
TriggerLockGk 0/α
2
Figure 2: Definition of the strategies of the Controller
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Strategies Resources Latencies
OneA Bit1ak 0/α2k
Lock1ai(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gk has gi as input a:
Bit1ak 0/α
2k
Lock1ak(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gk has gi as input b:
Bit1bk 0/α
2k
Lock1bk(Gi) 0/M
3
OneB Bit1bk 0/α2k
Lock1bi(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gk has gi as input a:
Bit1ak 0/α
2k
Lock1ak(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gk has gi as input b:
Bit1bk 0/α
2k
Lock1bk(Gi) 0/M
3
Zero Bit0ai 0/α2k
Bit0bi 0/α
2k
Lock0ai(Gi) 0/M
3
Lock0bi(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gk has gi as input a:
Bit0ak of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock0ak(Gi) of G(S) 0/M3
If gate gk has gi as input b:
Bit0bk 0/α
2k
Lock0bk(Gi) 0/M
3
Figure 3: Definition of the strategies of the players Gi with 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
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Strategies Resources Latencies
One TriggerXi,0 0/αβ
BlockXi,1 0/M
4
If gate gk of circuit S has xi as input a:
Bit1ak of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock1ak(Xi) of G(S) 0/M3
If gate gk of circuit S has xi as input b:
Bit1bk of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock1bk(Xi) of G(S) 0/M3
Zero TriggerXi,1 0/αβ
BlockXi,0 0/M
4
If gate gk of circuit S has xi as input a:
Bit0ak of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock0ak(Xi) of G(S) 0/M3
If gate gk of circuit S has xi as input b:
Bit0bk of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock0bk(Xi) of G(S) 0/M3
Figure 4: Definition of the strategies of the players Xi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Strategies Resources Latencies
Lock001 TriggerUnlockGi α/α3
Lock0ai(Gi) 0/M
3
Lock0bi(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gi has gk as input a:
Lock1ai(Gk) incl. X and Y 0/M3
LockGatek(LockGi) without X Y 0/M
If gate gi has gl as input b:
Lock1bi(Gl) 0/M
3
LockGatel(LockGi) 0/M
Lock101 TriggerUnlockGi α/α3
Lock0ai(Gi) 0/M
3
Lock0bi(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gi has gk as input a:
LockGatek(LockGi) 0/M
Lock0ai(Gk) 0/M
3
If gate gi has gl as input b:
Lock1bi(Gl) 0/M
3
LockGatel(LockGi) 0/M
Lock011 TriggerUnlockGi α/α3
Lock0ai(Gi) 0/M
3
Lock0bi(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gi has gk as input a:
Lock1ai(Gk) 0/M
3
LockGatek(LockGi) 0/M
If gate gi has gl as input b:
Lock0bi(Gl) 0/M
3
LockGatel(LockGi) 0/M
Lock110 TriggerUnlockGi α/α3
Lock1ai(Gi) 0/M
3
Lock1bi(Gi) 0/M
3
If gate gi has gk as input a:
Lock0ai(Gk) 0/M
3
LockGatek(LockGi) 0/M
If gate gi has gl as input b:
LockGatel(LockGi) 0/M
3
Lock0bi(Gl) 0/M
Unlock LockGatei(Controller) 0/M2
TriggerLockGi 0/α
2
If gate gk has gi as input a:
LockGatei(LockGk) 0/M
Figure 5: Definition of the strategies of the players LockGi with 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
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Strategies Resources Latencies
One Onej 4α4γj
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input a:
Bit1ak of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock1ak(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input b:
Bit1bk of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock1bk(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
Changeji,b Changej 3α
3γj
(for all BlockS0 0/M2
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} TriggerXi,b 0/αβ
ResetDoneYj 0/M
5
and b ∈ {0, 1}) For all 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j:
TriggerYj′ 0/5α
5γj
′
For all vectors (i′, j′, b′) except (i, j, b)
with i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and b′ ∈ {0, 1}:
BlockSj
′
i′,b′ 0/M
2
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input a:
Bit1ak of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock1ak(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input b:
Bit1bk of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock1bk(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
Checkji,b Checkj 2α
2γj
(for all TriggerYj 0/5α5γj
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} BlockXi,1−b 0/M
4
and b ∈ {0, 1}) TriggerController 1/β2
ResetDoneYj 0/M
5
For all 1 ≤ j′ < j:
TriggerDoneYj′ 0/M
4
For all vectors (i′, j′, b′) except (i, j, b)
with i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and b′ ∈ {0, 1}:
BlockSj
′
i′,b′ 0/M
2
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input a:
Lock0ak(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
Bit0ak of G(S) 0/α2k
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input b:
Bit0bk of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock0bk(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
For all gates gk of circuit S0:
TriggerLockGk 0/α
2
Zero TriggerYj 0/5α5γj
TriggerDoneYj 0/M
4
BlockYj 0/M
2
ResetDoneYj 0/M
5
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input a:
Lock0ak(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
Bit0ak of G(S) 0/α2k
If gate gk of circuit S has yj as input b:
Bit0bk of G(S) 0/α2k
Lock0bk(Yj) of G(S) 0/M3
Figure 6: Definition of the strategies of the players Yj with 1 ≤ j ≤ m.24
